Role and mechanisms of the World Bank in policy transfer

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Abstract—What is the role of World Bank, and what mechanisms it applies in education policy transfer in the developing countries? The aim of the paper is to compare the perceptions about the future of World Bank. The question about the forms of influence of the World Bank, and its behavior in front of the recipient countries is permanently launched by critics with different backgrounds. The World Bank report of 2008 ‘The road not traveled’ in the Middle East and Africa (Mena) illustrates in a more concrete form the mechanism used by the World Bank for the policy transfer, and the strategic concepts used by its experts. Overall, two mechanisms of policy transfer can be represented in the Mena and the Development Reports (2007). First, the voluntary application of the policies is suggested by the World Bank to the Mena, by the recommendation of several policies to reform the educational sector. On the other hand, the indirect coercive form is applied in the youth policies in the Development Report (2007), where the international tendencies are used to push particular countries to the desirable policies. The report cases reflect two of the three mechanisms explained by Dolowitz and Marsh to apply the policy transfer in educational sector. In those opportunities the World Bank assumes the role of knowledge authority, based on its experience. Further, the Bank uses its international leadership to confront the successful outcomes in model countries to encourage others to materialize the policy package designed by its free market ideology. That represents a first interaction among the actors, where internal groups have the opportunity to interact with the Bank experts and share the design of policies to the educative system.

Keywords— Economic Development, Policy transfer, Social Development, World Bank.

Resumen— ¿Cuál es el papel del Banco Mundial? ¿qué mecanismos aplica en la transferencia de políticas en materia de educación en países en vía de desarrollo? El objetivo del artículo es comparar las percepciones sobre el futuro del Banco Mundial. La respuesta sobre los métodos de acción del Banco Mundial y su comportamiento frente a los países receptores recibe críticas permanentes desde diferentes fuentes. El Reporte del Banco Mundial del 2008 ‘El camino no recorrido’ en el Medio Este y África (MENA) sirve para ilustrar de manera más concretas los mecanismos usados por el Banco Mundial para la transferencia de políticas y los conceptos estratégicos usados por expertos. En términos generales, hay dos mecanismos de transferencias de políticas que pueden ser representados en Mena y en el Reporte de Desarrollo del 2007. Primero, la aplicación voluntaria de las políticas es sugerida por el Banco Mundial al MENA a través de recomendaciones sobre reformas al sector educativo. Por otro lado, la forma coercitiva es aplicada en políticas de
juvenud en el Reporte de Desarrollo del 2007, donde las tendencias internacionales presionan a los países a aplicar políticas deseables por la comunidad internacional. Los casos incluidos en los reportes mencionan dos de los tres mecanismos explicados por la literatura de Dolowitz y Marsh para implementar políticas en el sector educativo. En estas oportunidades, El Banco Mundial asume el papel de un ‘Banco de conocimiento’ basado en su experiencia sobre la introducción de políticas educativas. De manera adicional, el Banco usa su liderazgo internacional para confrontar países con experiencias exitosas y países que apenas van a vincularse a las políticas de desarrollo deseadas por el Banco. Así introduce un paquete de políticas, basado en la ideología del libre mercado y alejado de las estructuras de gobernanza jerárquicas en el sistema educativo. Así se propicia la primera interacción entre los actores, donde los grupos internos tienen la oportunidad de relacionarse con los expertos del Banco y comparten actividades en el diseño de políticas dentro del sistema educativo.

**Palabras clave**— Desarrollo Económico, Transferencia de Políticas, Desarrollo Social, Banco Mundial.

**JEL Codes:** F42, F6, G20, O21

1. **Introduction**

What is the role of World Bank, and what mechanisms it applies in education policy transfer in the developing countries? The aim of the paper is to compare the perceptions about the future of the World Bank. The question about the forms of influence of the World Bank, and its behavior in front of the recipient countries is permanently launched by critics with different backgrounds.

Particularly, its function in the design and application of educational policies is enquired by the mechanisms used, and the interests that designed the content of its recommendations. Despite the suspects about its ways of operation, the literature shows that World Bank is one of the most influential actors in the international arena.

Even as there are some ideal principles that created the international organization, like solving problems and multilateral cooperation, some leftist critics describe the Bank such as a pathological and coercive instrument of the economic and political ideology to shapes the society, included the educational system.

2. **Methods**
Comparative methods point out the key point, which made the difference between the both cases. Documentary analysis allow to compare theoretical background and empirical evidence. Two reports elaborated by the World Bank in 2007 and 2008, about the difficulties and outcomes of educational system in developing countries, will allow to see the mechanisms that World Bank uses to transfer policies on governments and other internals actors.

3. **Policy Transfer**

Evans (2009) defines policy transfer like a mechanism of organizational learning. In the same line, Stone (2018) points out that policy transfer use to be ‘soft transfer’, because it refers to the information of ideas. The ‘new’ classic theory of policy transfer is stated by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996). Specifically, the concept of policy transfer is defined by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) in terms of the role of actors and the application of programs: “Policy transfer refers to the process by which actors borrow policies developed in one setting to develop programs and polices within another” (p. 357). In this process the experience and knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements and institutions is used to develop others in other time or place. According to the authors, policy transfer is not a new issue; however the international interactions after the Second World War have accelerated this process.

According to Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), there are six main categories of actors, which are involved in policy transfer: elected officials, political parties, bureaucratic/civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs/experts, and supra-national institutions. Specifically, during the process of the policy transfer there are interactions of ideas between experts from inside and outside, who form epistemic communities. At time, the intergovernmental and international organizations, such as actors involved in the policy transfer, exchanges ideas between countries. For instance, the World Bank and the United Nations agencies focus on programs of concern to developing countries.

In addition, during the policy transfer there are “one government or supra-national institution pushing, or even forcing, another government to adopt a particular policy” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, p. 346).
Going deeply, there are three mechanisms of policy transfer: voluntary, coercive, and indirectly coercive. The mechanism used during the process of policy transfer depend on the dynamic of each case, between the World Bank and the willing of the government to be involved in the application of the policies.

In the first case, the mechanism of ‘Voluntary’ policy transfer is developed by the free choices of the political actors. “Voluntary transfer is some forms of dissatisfaction model presume that when governmental policies are functioning properly there is no need to search for lessons; everything can operate through established routines. Only when routines stop providing ‘solutions’ is it necessary to search for lessons” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, p. 346). In the voluntary policies transfer there is an interaction among strategic actors in a transnational scale, which offer their knowledge and experience, in order to define the best policies to apply in the country. Therefore, in this situation is possible the interdependence of actors, that implies the interactive communication in front of the problem.

On the other hand, the coercive type reflects a more explicit friction between the actors. “The most direct method of coercive policy transfer is when one government forces another to adopt a policy” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, p. 347) For instance, Dolowitz and Marsh describe how supranational institutions represent Western monetary policies to the Third World. By doing so, some of them, as “IMF will stipulate economic policies that have to be implemented if the loans is to be granted” (p. 348). This mechanism implies less cooperation between external and internal actors. Therefore, external actors design the policies, allocate the resources and point out how to apply them.

Third, the indirect coercive transfer is defined by Dolowitz and Marsh, such as the use of particular circumstances that push the government to move in a specific direction. This type of policy transfer uses different ways: The externalities, where the interdependence pushes governments to get answers to common problems; the lack of technology, which undermined the alternatives of the weaker country in the international relation; the world economy and the international consensus could accelerate the need to apply certain policy; and a country could force to change other, “if political actors perceive their country as falling behind its
neighbors or competitors” (p. 349). For instance, in the indirect coercive transfer the outcome of the policies in one country allows use its experience to repeat the policy package in other place.

Additionally, during the policy transfer there are seven objects of transfer: policy goals, structure and content; policy instruments or administrative techniques; institutions; ideology; ideas; attitudes and concepts; and negative lessons. In addition, there are different degrees of transfer: Copying when a country applies exactly a program; emulation if the country adapts a program according to its particular characteristics; hybridization and synthesis where there is a mix of programs applied in different countries. “Finally, studying familiar problems in an unfamiliar setting can expand ideas and rise fress hinging about what is possible at home” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, p. 351).

As policy transfer implies the interaction of several actors and at least one international organization and a government, the literature tends to understand the phenomenon of policy transfer by the pluralist approach, where “political actors are rational, calculating subjects” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, p. 355). However, Dolowitz and Marsh state how this relation is less objective. “The strategic decisions of actors are taken in a context which is mostly not of their making and which is characterized by structured inequality” (p. 355)

However, at the end, the internal actors decide how to apply in real terms the policies transferred. Political institutions inside the country have the role of materializes the policies, according to its interests, perspective and abilities. “Indeed, in some cases of coercive transfer actors have little or any autonomy of action. Certainly, a political leader in a Third World country has little alternative but to accept the policies imposed by the World Bank or the IMF, given the consequences of refusal are deepening debt and economic and, probably political crisis” (Dolowitz & Marsh, p. 356) Therefore, the types of policy transfer depend on the context, the interest of the international community and the openness of the recipient country to accept the policy package.

4. World Bank policies
The policy transfer implies the political relation between external and internal forces in the country. This dialogue, such as other kinds of interaction, has allowed the existence of the International Organizations, by the principles of multilateralism and cooperation. According to Barnet and Finnemore (1999) the International Organizations were created as a logic process of achieve the order between the actors and to solve problems. “Theories explain IO creation as a response to problems of incomplete information, transaction costs, and other barriers to Pareto efficiency and welfare improvement for their members” (p. 699) Therefore, the International Organizations assume the role of moderator between the members. “IOs articulate and diffuse new norms, principles, and actors around the globe. All of these sources of power flow from the ability of IOs to structure knowledge” (Finnemore, p. 710) By doing so, the IOs embody a level of authority in front of the other actors. “Guy Gran similarly describes how the World Bank sets up criteria to define someone as a peasant in order to distinguish them from a farmer, day laborer, and other categories. Only certain classes of people are recognized by the World Bank’s development machinery as having knowledge that is relevant in solving development problems” (p. 711).

In the same way, as the International Organizations are created for the multilateral cooperation, the educational policies tend to answer to the ideals principles of understanding. In addition, the educational system disseminates ideological principles from the international community. By doing so, according to Mundy (1998), the World Bank supports the stabilization, expansion and further integration of capitalist economy. It also, integrated South countries into the North societies by the idea of modernization. The multilateralism is described by international cooperation which supports domestic demand for social programs, “as typified both in IMF/World Bank programs of structural adjustment and in the diffusion of neoliberal approaches to public policy through multilateral organizations” (p. 6).

Mundy classifies three phases of educational multilateralism: 1) from 1945 to 1965 there was place for the redistributive educational multilateralism. 2) Between late 1960s and 1970s, when the IOs have a reaction in front of the claims for a NIEO form the South countries. 3) From late 1970s to the present, with the educational cooperation in the neoliberal system.
In the same way, Mundy remarks that the role of the World Bank also has changed according to the emergence of new actors, as nongovernmental organizations. These groups claim that World Bank, IMF and WTO should be more democratic organizations.

For instance, the criteria of efficiency and productivity, as its indicators of rate of return, have been critiqued by the emergent actors that claim for more representation in the educational system.

However, the traditional principles of the World Bank have remained in its policies. For instance, during the 1980s the World Bank policies emphasized on the efficient use of educational inputs, like teachers, texts, and tests. Specially, it focuses on primary education, by the principle of ‘Education for all’. According to this perspective, the private sector had a more relevant role to increase the efficiency. In this period, the multilateralism involved programs of financing and adjustment, and the conditional lending based on the disciplined application of policies. According to Mundy perception, these reforms by the policies recommended by the Bank and the IMF strengthened the role of these institutions as ‘managers of the global economy’.

In that way, the IO tends to transmit models of ‘good’ political behavior. “The IMF and the World Bank are explicit about their role as transmitters of norms and principles form advanced market economies to less-developed economies. (…) The World Bank, similarly, has a major role in arbitrating the meanings of development and norms of behavior appropriate to the task of developing oneself”. (Barnet & Finnemore, 1999, p. 714)

However, Barnet and Finnemore (1998) ask about the characteristics of this knowledge, and the definition of ‘good’ behavior. “The same sources of bureaucratic power, sketched earlier, can cause dysfunctional behavior. We term this particular type of dysfunction pathology”. (p. 716)

By doing so, the countries could be pushed to have a reaction in front of the behavior of the International Organizations or in front of other countries. “Competition among subunits over material resources leads the organization to make decisions and engage in behavior that are
inefficient or undesirable as judged against some ideal policy that would better allow the IO to achieve its stated goals” (Barnet & Finnemore, 1998, p. 716).

In the case of the interdependence, there are different levels of understanding the ‘good’ behavior. For example, a model inferred by the external actor could not be applied in the expected way for the internal ones. “Decisions are not made after a rational decision process but rather through a competitive bargain process over turf, budgets, and staff that may benefit parts of the organization at the expense of overall goals” (Barnet & Finnemore, 1998, p. 717) Therefore, there are a political friction between the interest of the member countries of the international organization, and the internal actors of each country. Barnet and Finnemore quote the bureaucracies inside the governments, such as a cause of the diphase between the expected behavior and the real application of the models.

Going deeply, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) seek how an International Organizations, like the World Bank, develop the ‘good’ models. The definitions of ‘good’ behavior, or ‘good economy’, depend on how the World Bank’s experts define the method to measure the application of policies. What is more, the desirable policies go in the direction of the member countries ideology. In the case of the World Bank, the neoliberal ideology has received permanent critiques. “The inability to quantify many costs and benefits associated with antipoverty and basic human needs norms created resistance among the many economist staffing the Bank, because projects promoting these norms could not be justified on the basis of ‘good economies’” (p. 899).

The mechanisms for the socialization of the ‘good’ policies from the World Bank include on the one hand diplomatic praise or censure bilateral or multilateral. On the other hand, the dissemination of the knowledge about the good policies could be by hand sanctions and incentives, if the situation implies political friction. For instance, the World Bank could offer flexibility in the pays of loans, according to the disciplined of the country to apply the policies recommended.

Additionally, the content of the good policies package from the World Bank had change according to the new knowledge of its experts and the significant shifts in the political and
economic international context. By doing so, the World Bank policies have received permanent critics from several sectors. Specifically, the educational policies have been one of the more criticized issues of the World Bank. However, Heyneman (2003) states that “in spite of the importance of having intelligence education policies for social and economic development, there is no single international organization to effectively provide them” (p. 315).

Therefore, there are different perspectives and models to answer to the educational issues. One of the more frequently concepts in the educational policies of the Bank is the human capital. This model evaluates the impact of the investment in education, led the World Bank to define the balance of outputs of the sector. In other words, the World Bank points out the amount of graduated and the areas of knowledge that each country need. The World Bank has stimulated the programs of engineers, because of its relation with the technology, the infrastructure development and the innovation.

However, the most common indicator about the impact of the investment in education has been the rate of return. “A common principle form the beginning of the World Bank has been the notion that lending was analogous to start capital. If an economy could not generate sufficient resources to maintain a paved road, then an investment should be limited to the roads” (Heyneman, 2003, p. 322) In this way, for instance, the World Bank has a strong position against the elimination of tuition, because the experts consider that it causes the inefficiency of the educational system. “Justification for higher education tending was thus, confined to efficiency and equity rationales” (p. 327)

Going deeply, the mechanisms, contents and indicators of policy transfer could be seek in the following two reports, about education system and the correspondent recommendation by the World Bank. The first one is the Middle East and Africa (Mena) report in 2008, and the second one is the Development Report in 2007.

In order to see the concrete elements of the democratization of international organization, the World Bank case allows seeking the theoretical process suggested by Nash and Gills. For instance, Pincus and Winters (2002) describe how during the existence of WB, different
groups have designed proposals for reform it. According to these models, the authors conclude that the Bank operates with relatively dysfunction and political friction, in order to answer to the different interests of each model.

By doing so, Pincus et al. have classified the proposals for reinventing the WB in four models: the Knowledge Bank, the Niche Player, the dissolution, and the Development Bank. Each one has different structures that define the operation between the bank’s lending program and its development objectives, the concept about the institution’s vision development, and the power between the Bank, member countries, and the wider publics.

The Knowledge Bank is an idea associated with Joseph Stiglitz, chief economist of the WB between 1997 and 2000. The Bank’s experience allows it to offer technical assistance, policy advice, and aid coordination. It simultaneously combines the activities of financial intermediary development, research institution, and consulting company.

The second model is the Bank as a Niche Player that reflects the right-wings position. According to this perspective, the public sector should no longer have a direct role in development financing. There would be aid selectivity in terms of good policies, such as low inflation, fiscal surplus, institutional quality and trade openness, and the aid should be exclusively for the world’s poor countries.

The third model reflects the left populist view that the WB cannot be reformed, and therefore it should be shut-down. Environmental groups remark the weak outcome of the social policies. They seek to reduce new funding after 50 years of existence of the WB. Instead, there would be a multilateral system which involves NGOs, other International Organizations, like the UN, and agencies.

The last vision described by Pincus and Winters is the Development Bank. Unlike the others models, here the World Bank should focus on economic growth. The WB would be free to focus on making public sector loans to promote economic development, based on the impact of programs. It should be a more pluralistic and decentralized institution. The risk of this perspective is if the First World is prepared to accept the political consequences associated with restructuring the WB, in the direction of a more democratized institution.
“The United States, as the Bank’s dominant shareholder, is less concerned about the moral hazard problems endemic to the knowledge bank idea than the potential loss of control associated with meaningful decentralization of WB functions” (Pincus et al., p. 24). Therefore, the particular interests of the member countries make more difficult the reform of the Bank.

On the other hand, the relation could be less voluntary. “Domestic opposition makes it harder to reach any agreement. Domestic opposition might arise as a result of interest group efforts and opposition political parties, electoral cycles, and even institutional arrangements requiring legislative approval of international agreements” (Abouharb et al., 2006, p. 243).

Therefore, Abouharb and Cingranelli (2006) show that according to the willing of each recipient country, the WB applies particular policies. Democratic governments tend to accept the dialogue with the international organizations, while authoritarian governments receive more coercive mechanism from the Bank, such as the pressure of conditional loans.

In addition, the extent of application of democracy principles of the WB is reflected by the non-economic selection criteria to the implementation of the SAAs. Abouharb et al. (2006) point out the disequilibrium of interests among the members countries of the WB. “For the last 25 years, the United States and Japan have been the largest contributors to the Bank, so it is reasonable to assume that the preferences of their country representatives have dominated the preferences of other members of the Bank’s Board of Directors”. (p. 242)

By doing so, Abouharb et al. (2006) use a global comparative analysis for the 1981 – 2000 period, when the WB awarded 442 SAAs to all countries in the world, not just less developed countries. They asked for the effect on government respect for citizens’ rights to freedom from torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing, and disappearances. All of these effects are practices against the tolerance and the cosmopolitanism, defined above.

The empirical study of Abouharb and Cingranelli (2006) conclude that the implementation of the World Bank policies have a great risk to impact in negative form the Human Rights. “The most important substantive finding of this study is that receiving and implementing a SAA form the World Bank had the net effect of worsening government respect for all types of physical integrity rights” (p. 256).
The cause of the negative effect of the implementation of WB policies in Human Rights is that “the rapid, externally imposed economic liberalization of the type insisted upon by the WB has led to increased government violations of physical integrity rights” (Abouharb et al., 2006, p. 258). Therefore, the protection of Human Right Agreements such as main indicator of the democratization of international organization, according to Nash, is unsuccessful in the role of the WB. The dialogue among WB and the recipient countries does not receive enough attention to civil rights, according to the study of Abouharb et al.

On the one hand, the Bank has received significant pressure from social movements in order to reform their policies and operations. The WB has answered with a shift from exclusive economic criteria to social initiatives during the design of its policies, as Pincus et al. described. However, on the other hand, it only represents the role of listening and accepting different ideas, and that is not enough to achieve a democratization process, like Gills warns. It also need that the dialogue makes a change in the behavior of the participants to the respect all the actors; in this case, the World Bank, the social movements and the recipient countries, even though that is unsuccessful.

5. Two cases of policies transfer

The World Bank report of 2008 ‘The road not traveled’ in the Middle East and Africa (Mena) illustrates in a more concrete form the mechanism used by the World Bank for the policy transfer, and the strategic concepts used by its experts. “Human capital is considered an important determinant of economic growth and an effective vehicle to reducing inequality and absolutely poverty” (WB, 2008, p. 7) Overall, on based of this diagnosis, the diffusion of policies for the high education system in MENA is characterized by the prescription of efficiency, quality, constrain output and fees.

First, in order to increase the efficiency, the policy transfer from the World Bank recommendations point out the need of increasing the hours per week that academic staff facilities are utilized, introducing self-study methods. Further, the World Bank prescribes the reduction of employers in the educational sector, especially of nonteaching staff.

A second change promoted in the educational policies in Mena is related to the quality of education. According to the World Bank the scores of African students in verbal, analytical
and quantitative tests are lower than others in Latin America, Asia and Middle-East. One of the causes is the lack investment in infrastructure. “Establishing equitable access required an accurate mapping of the educational system” (WB, 2008, p. 284) The policy packages also appeal to the revitalization of the sector. This process includes the investment in textbooks, strengthening in examination systems, and in physical plant.

Third, the World Bank advises about the areas of knowledge that society needs. According to the conclusion of the World Bank experts, Mena applies a wrong mix of outputs of the higher education system, because it does not correspond to the development needs. The educational system produces too much teachers, and not enough professionals for the innovation sector. Therefore, the proportion of students graduating of arts and humanities is higher than scientific and engineers.

The fourth objective from the policy transfer of World Bank in Mena includes the expanded cost-sharing by beneficiaries. Therefore, there are small institutions and African countries should change their policies on fees. On the other hand, the Bank remarks how in the third sector, has increased the cost sharing, by the application of tuition. “Introduce new types of programs for different populations, and sometimes introduce fees for specific training” (p. 93). According to the World Bank position, the no-fee policy contributes to increase the unit cost, because the students do not contain expenditures, and the educational system loss efficiency.

Other aspect in the MENA report is the fact that the World Bank also recommends how to implement and receive the transfer of policies. “Leaders may attempt to build consensus about education objectives and policies by creation reform commissions” (WB, 2008, p. 130).

Other case, which reflects the policy transfer mechanisms, is the World Development Report (World Bank, 2007). Here, the World Bank emphasizes again in the application of policies that focus on efficiency, which implies less cost. However, in this opportunity the World Bank assumes a role of adviser, based on the comparison of different countries. “Efficiency
gains may be possible through better incentives for administrators and teachers, such as performance-based pay schemes now being tried in some Latin American countries” (p. 12). Further, the World Bank applies a mechanism of indirect coercion, when compares the countries which apply its policy of tuition, in front of the countries where there are not fees. “Families already contribute significantly to the cost of tertiary education in some countries – up to 80 percent of the cost in high-performing economies with relatively high enrollment rates such as Chile and Republic of Korea. Countries as Slovak Republic, Turkey and Uruguay, where private funds contribute 20 percent or less of the total cost of tertiary levels, could mobilize more resources through fees, public-private partnerships, income generating, activities, and donor support” (p. 13). By doing so, the World Bank uses the international pressure to disseminate its ‘good’ policies.

Other policy pushed by the World Bank (2007) is the education to the free market. “Policies that open the economy to free trade tend to be youth friendly” (p. 13) Specifically, about the Asian economies, the report says: “They need policies and institutions that broaden the opportunities for young people to develop their human capital and use it productively in work” (p. 5). In this way, the World Bank suggests that there are some areas where the developing countries should intensify the amount of graduates.

In the case of the Development Report, as in the Mena report, the World Bank remarks the need of higher education in the fields of engineer and technology. “The global wave of economic and technological change is demanding more from workers than basic skills. For example, in many Latin American countries, supply has no kept out with the rising demand for skills. The problem is not only one of insufficient numbers, but also of irrelevant training” (World Bank, 2007; p. 6)

6. Discussion

Policy transfer describes a path of evolution within World Bank interests. According to this institutional change of the WB, it also has change the focus of its policies. For instance, Abouharb and Cingranelli (2006) point out the Human Rights effects of WB structural adjustment agreement (SAA). First, they state that there are two perspectives in front of the
relation of the WB policies and the Human Rights. “Neoliberal theory suggests that SAAs improve economic performance, generating better Human Rights practices” (p. 233) On the other hand, there are other studies that remark the unfavorable consequences of policies package for the countries. “Most studies agree that the imposition of SAAs on less developed countries worsens government Human Right practices” (Abouharb et al., 2006 p. 233)

Abouharb et al. (2006) found a direct relation between democracy and the SAAs in the countries recipient of policy transfer. “More democratic government were less likely to enter into SAAs (…) Democracies have an advantage when negotiating international agreements, because their governments can make more credible commitments” (p. 243).

7. Conclusion

Overall, two mechanisms of policy transfer can be represented in the Mena and the Development Reports (2007). First, the voluntary application of the policies is suggested by the World Bank to the Mena, by the recommendation of several policies to reform the educational sector. On the other hand, the indirect coercive form is applied in the youth policies in the Development Report (2007), where the international tendencies are used to push particular countries to the desirable policies.

In the first case, the principles of efficiency, quality, share cost and contraction of outputs are justified in front of the diagnostic of the educational system. Therefore, the voluntary transfer is given to the internal actors to apply, as an alternative to answer to the dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the educational system.

There is a scheme of solutions, represented in the policies package designed by the World Bank. According to the experience and knowledge of the experts, the causes and consequences of the ineffective policies are showed to the governments. In the Mena case the World Bank begins a dialogue, by the argument of each one of its recommendations, in order to answer a known problem. Therefore, the World Bank invites the internal actors to participate in the solution. By doing so, the World Bank tends to persuade the governments to turn the educational policies in the direction of the Bank opinion.
On the other hand, the case of Development Report (2007) contains the indirect coercive transfer. The confrontation among the countries' achievements pushes the government to move in a desirable direction. The world economy and the international acceptance of strategic policies, as the cost sharing of the fees, and the reduction of graduates in humanities, accompanied by the increasing of engineers, pretend to accelerate the need to apply certain norms, in the indirect way.

Therefore, the World Bank in the Development Report of 2007 compares the performance of each country, in front of the policies at the educative system. Further, some programs to tackle the educational problems of specific countries are offered to the internal actors, in order to repeat the effective processes in other experiences.

Broadly speaking, the Mena and Development Report cases reflect two of the three mechanisms explained by Dolowitz and Marsh to apply the policy transfer in educational sector. In those opportunities the World Bank assumes the role of knowledge authority, based on its experience. Further, the Bank uses its international leadership to confront the successful outcomes in model countries to encourage others to materialize the policy package designed by its free market ideology. That represents a first interaction among the actors, where internal groups have the opportunity to interact with the Bank experts and share the design of policies to the educative system.

8. Bibliographic References


